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VISUALIZING THE LAW IN THE BAROQUE AGE
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is 1711 and Paris is at play, buying up promissory notes and securities,
speculating and tearing itself apart. Louis XIV’s reign is ending in a huge economic
crisis,1 and if the people are starving at these times, some are taking benefits from
the speculation. The year 1711, then, is not so far from 2012.
In 1711, a year of crisis and speculation, an Almanach is published in Paris by
Gérard Jollain. These Almanachs, usually printed by artisans controlled by the royal
regime, have long marked every year. This particular Almanach contains an engraving
entitled La Déroute des agioteurs (Defeat of the speculators), 2 which is large enough (a
folio format) to be pinned or displayed on a wall, and is designed to stay on the wall
throughout the year. Its upper half depicts a Parisian salon in a state of extreme
disarray; Themis, who embodies justice, strikes down those who have speculated on
the mass-produced paper money—public and private, real and virtual—that has been
allowed to circulate during the economic crisis of these years. In the lower half, on
the left, Democritus, dressed as a fool, is seen laughing. Beneath his image, we read:
The shifting spectacle of the world here below,
Where I see such numerous and varied accidents of fortune in a single day,
Riches, honour, to which all aspire,
Birth, Death, Pleasures, and Sufferings,
Tears and Laughter, Good Fortune and Bad,
This medley in a word makes me swoon with laughter. 3

Heraclitus, on the right, responds to Democritus, lamenting at the social spectacle
before him.
You who laugh like a madman over so sorry a subject,
My feelings are far distant from yours, my response is quite different,
Why! Unhappy mankind, in constant crisis,
This mixture of states, this clamour, these changes,
Birth, life, death, all these, precisely,
Cause me to surrender myself to sighs and tears.4

1.

See generally Martial Poirson, Spectacle et économie à l’âge classique: XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles
(2011).

2.

La Déroute des agioteurs (Defeat of the speculators), reproduced in Maxime Préaud, Les Effets du
soleil: Almanachs du règne de Louis XIV, at 140–41 (1995).

3.

Id. at 141 (“Le theatre Inconstant de ce bas Univers, / Où Je Vois en Un Jour tant d’accidents divers, /
Les Richesses, l’honneur où tout le monde aspire, / La Naissance, la Mort, les Plaisirs, les Douleurs, /
Les Larmes et les Ris, le Bonheur les Malheurs, / Ce Mélange en un mot me fait Pâmer de rire.”)
(modernized spelling).

4.

Id. (“Toi qui ris comme un fou d’un si triste sujet, / Loin de ton sentiment j’en fais un autre objet, / quoi!
L’homme malheureux, toujours dans les alarmes, / ce mélange d’états, ce bruit, ce changement, / Naître,
vivre mourir, tout cela Justement, / me font abandonner aux soupirs et aux larmes.”) (modernized spelling).
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La Déroute des agioteurs (Defeat of the speculators), reproduced in Maxime Préaud, Les Effets du soleil:
Almanachs du règne de Louis XIV, at 141 (1995).
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II. AN EFFECTIVE VIRTUALITY

Should our response be to laugh or weep? Should we place our trust in Justice,
who has brought her scales into the heart of Paris, holding them in her left hand as
she sends out bolts of lightning with her right to strike down the miscreant speculators
gathered around a table piled high with bags stuffed full with paper money? Should
we rely on a providential, highly moral, or even supernatural outcome to cut out the
gangrene and fight against the fashionable evil of speculation?
By referring directly to the spectator’s world, by representing this world more or
less directly, the images and the comic theatre of the end of Louis XIV’s reign—
more than any other media—provided simulacra that enabled the simultaneous
evaluation of the faults, pretences, lies, and negotiations of the political and theatrical
worlds. Representation of images of the contemporaneous present in almanachs, and
comedy itself, is of course a form of pretence, but this pretence transcribed a stylised
reality that was itself a tissue of pretences, and whose workings were assessed through
images and theatre. Considering comedy and reality in both worlds, what was just
and certain had become uncertain, and justice was portrayed as relative and negotiated
to such an extent that the interest that emerged from within the theatrical relationship
could only be profoundly critical in nature. It was possible to show outrage at all this,
to restore order, to be scandalised even, within the play itself as a way of making
interest “useful” and binding it to a moral, social, and political norm. But it was clear
that the harm had already been done and that audiences had literally interested
themselves in the dysfunctions of society and of the aesthetic relationship.
Hesitation between fiction and reality; between certainty and uncertainty;
anxiety coming from a general oscillation and doubt about values; discordance
between social conducts and behaviours and principles of law; fascination with
virtuality—these are the observations that Richard Sherwin’s book 5 draws for our
period, and they are what we have also noticed for the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. This post-baroque period, coming just before the Enlightenment, definitely
has something to say to those of us who are living in a postmodern and neo-baroque
period. The current “digital baroque” resembles the early modern one. From this
Almanach’s response, then, and from a study of the comedies of this period quoted on
the Almanach’s image, we will try to analyse the way this period is visualizing law—
not in court, but on propaganda images and in theatre—perhaps to support the
political and social establishment, but also to demonstrate that Themis represents
and performs only a semblance and an effective virtuality of virtue and justice.
III. THE UNCERTAINTY OVER DECLINING VALUES

It was natural for comic theatre to share in the general feeling of uncertainty over
declining values and the obsession of the times with private interest and increasingly
rapid cycles of production and consumption. This is because the primary function of
literature is to provide a critical reflection on the workings of the world and on the
5.

Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques and
Entanglements (2011).
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way a society functions; it conveys the general meaning of social reality and aims to
employ the aesthetic means at its disposal to, at the very least, speak of this world
and, at best, act on the world it represents. As Daniel Roche asserts, the end of the
seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth
constitute an important period in [economic] thought. We find in it the roots
of what would finally emerge in the work of Adam Smith but, above all, it
contains the groundwork for an analytical, planned, and rational economy as
is demonstrated, for example, by the work of Boisguilbert, who formulated
the theory of a demand-based economy. In the context of the crisis, of war, of
monetary problems, and of sudden price rises, the observation that “man’s
possession of an abundant supply is not the only requirement for wealth”
requires us to accept that the consumption of the population alone is the
deciding factor.6

There was thus, at this time, a real fascination with the concept of a private
interest that could clearly be seen in comic theatre and that established the individual,
acting in the economy, as master of his own fate. Private life became more
autonomous, the old values were collapsing or appeared to be eroded, the social
hierarchy was portrayed as permeable—even if this was more a fantasy than a
reality—and other, more personal “laws” were emerging that moved further away
from conventional or traditional morality. Literary aesthetics had entered the reign
of “rakes,” gamblers, speculators, and servants who abandoned their own class. And,
in society at large, this was a time when the nature of norms was being called into
doubt. It was a period of transition and this makes it inherently interesting, by virtue
of its reflexivity and of its occasionally erratic, and certainly problematic, nature.
IV. “SORTEZ DE NOTRE FRANCE, INDIGNES AGIOTEURS”!

The Almanach, in line with the general practice of the time, supports the
establishment, yet all it really contrives to do is propose a Themis who is partmachine, part-goddess as the sole agent capable of providing the world with a
semblance of virtue. In the background on the right-hand side of the salon scene in a
partly open doorway, we can read;
Begone from France
Unworthy speculators,
You tarnish our country’s wealth
And bring her many misfortunes.7
6.

Daniel Roche, Histoire des choses banales: Naissance de la consommation dans les sociétés
traditionnelles ( XVIIe-XIXe siècle), at 27 (1997) (“constituent un moment privilégié de la réflexion
[économique]. On y trouve les racines de ce qui émergera définitivement grâce à Adam Smith mais surtout
le fondement d’une économie analytique, réfléchie, rationnelle, dont témoigne par exemple l’œuvre de
Boisguilbert, qui formule la théorie d’une économie marchant à la demande. Dans le contexte de crise, de
guerres, de troubles monétaires, de hausses de prix discontinues, le constat que «l’abondance de l’homme
ne fait pas seulement la richesse» impose l’idée que seule la consommation de la population est décisive.”).

7.

La Déroute des agioteurs, supra note 2, at 141 (“Sortez de notre France / indignes agioteurs, / vous y
tarissez l’abondance / et y causez bien des malheurs”).
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The three stanzas at the centre of the engraving seek to define the economic,
political, and moral causes of the wrongdoers’ power in order to condemn them:
The war8 having authorised these cruel speculators
They easily bought up debts and securities and fished in troubled waters,
But the arm of Themis in striking down their pleasures
Obliges them to surrender all their gains and to repay in coin.
Until now these speculators laughed at our misfortunes.
From the ruin of the people they built their fortune,
But our assets will in their turn cost them tears
And their fall will lighten the hearts of all.
REGRETS OF THE SPECULATORS
For having speculated in all four Estates,
We are rightly persecuted by others
Let them take our houses, let them plunder our ducats,
The goods that we surrender will never be ours.9

Here, then, is a concluding moral, as in the best comedies, and a promise of order for
the year of grace, 1711. It gives the impression that Chamillart, the Controller
General of Finances, who had fought almost in vain against the speculators from
1707 to 1709, had been successful in bringing his struggle to an end by means of
some sort of divine intervention. But the economic crisis, as we know, was far from
over, just as the King’s wars were becoming decreasingly glorious and his coffers
increasingly empty.
The Almanach also demonstrates that a successful comedy could quickly become
a talking point during this period, for this engraving illustrates Dancourt’s play Les
Agioteurs, “The Speculators,” performed in 1710.10 The main characters in the
comedy are indeed the wrongdoers who are portrayed here, and their names even
8.

The War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714); see infra p. 121.

9.

La Déroute des agioteurs, supra note 2, at 141.
La Guerre autorisant Ces Cruels Agioteurs
Ils escomptaient sans peine et péchaient en Eau trouble,
Mais le Bras de Thémis foudroyant leurs Bonheurs
Les force de tout rendre et satisfaire au double.
Jusques ici ces Agiots ont ri de nos malheurs.
Des débris du Public bâtissant leur fortune,
Mais nos biens à leur tour leur vont coûter des pleurs
Et leur chute fera l’allégresse commune.
REGRETS DES AGIOTEURS
Pour avoir Agioté dans tous les quatre États,
Nous sommes justement opprimés par les autres
Qu’on prenne nos maisons, qu’on pille nos Ducats,
Les biens que nous rendons ne Seront jamais nôtres.
Id. (modernized spelling).

10.

Dancourt [Florent Carton], Les Agioteurs, comédie (Paris, P. Ribou 1710).
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appear on the engraving beside their images. Trapolin is the first to be punished,
along with his accomplice Monsieur Craquinet. These are followed by Chicanenville
(the scoundrel skilled in legal arguments), Durillon (the shady prosecutor), Madame
Sara (the rich widow seduced by Trapolin’s youth, who will finally decide to marry
the moneylender and master speculator Zacharie), and Zacharie himself. We can see
that the names of these “unworthy speculators” often suggest their status as
scapegoats, driven by the pressing need to round up a few Jews to help to show that
the economic and political misfortunes of the nation were caused by outsiders. (This
is a habit that France was never to lose.) However, as can be seen in other plays, the
activities of the Jews alone did not provide sufficient explanation for the extent of the
disaster.11
It was also necessary to mention the war—the long, expensive, and terrible War
of Spanish Succession (1701–1714), pitting France and Spain against a European
coalition—as a separate contributing factor and to accept that the carelessness of
some (gamblers and greenhorns such as the Baronne de Vapartout and Madame de
Malprofit, who is represented as a man in the Almanach) and the industry of others
(including the servant-financiers dreamed up by the popular imagination) had
together brought the country to the edge of the abyss. Only Mademoiselle Suzon, a
young marriageable woman, and Clitandre, a rake, are spared by the lightning bolts
of justice; they will make an almost honest marriage. Not that they have refrained
completely from speculation, nor from using their virtue as a gambling chip in
negotiating the best deal for themselves; but there must still appear to be winners in
this relative world. In any case, Suzon is partly punished, as can be seen by the letter
she holds, which serves as a speech bubble for her words, “Company paper notes and
interest notes. This lightning bolt disturbs our joy by destroying the paper money.”12
Justice herself, however shining she may appear, must thus enter into a compromise
with disorder.
Although the Almanach displays greater strength in depicting the supposed fall
of speculation than Dancourt’s play, and does so for very clear political reasons; and
although its quasi-official voice goes further, in a way, than that of the successful
author who had contented himself with the creation of a pleasing ambiguity; it is
nevertheless the case that the mere mention of all this economic turmoil sends a
clear signal that the world is at once a disturbing spectacle, according to Heraclitus,
and a joyful comedy, according to Democritus.
When value is negotiated, when gold is no longer the only reference commodity,
and when the whole city, lacking even the minimum of required virtue, gambles
with the law and calculates its matrimonial relationships in the same way that it
exchanges paper money, this is cause for comment, indignation, or laughter in the
theatre, in the novel, and in the almanachs themselves.
11.

See Christian Biet, Droit et littérature sous l’Ancien Régime: Le Jeu de la valeur et de la
loi, at ch. VIII–IX (2002).

12.

La Déroute des agioteurs, supra note 2, at 141 (“Billets / de Monnaie / de Compagnie / et d’Intérêt /Ce
foudre trou- / ble notre Joie / En détruisant les / Billets de Monnaie.”) (modernized spelling).
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V. A PROBLEMATIC TRANSITION

The production of trial briefs, like that of novels at the end of the eighteenth
century, demonstrates the advent of a new aesthetic based on a modern concept of
the individual that gave autonomy to authors, narrators, characters, spectators, and
readers. All of them became, in effect, fully “modern individuals,” each being
competent to form individual judgements within the framework of a relative system
of values that criticised, in practice, the concept of absolute value or immutable truth.
It had now become important to question not only the legal issues raised by
contemporary literary works, but also the nature of the economic relationships that
united or divided fictional characters.
There were two, related, reasons for this. On the one hand, as we have seen,
literature selected “interesting” characters—that is, characters who could slip through
the cracks in the law and gain an independence that the latter’s mechanisms were
unable to prevent. These characters “lacking in common law”13 were those who not
only made use of the law’s faults and fictions, but were also familiar with its processes,
adapting them for their own profit and personal interest. In this respect, they were a
source of amusement, concern, and inquiry, and were therefore of interest to readers.
On the other hand, such characters all shared an individual understanding of interest
based on the financial profit to be made in the course of a plot, and this was also
what placed them on opposing sides in dramatic and narrative schemas. This in turn
interested their audience. The important thing here was not that good should
triumph, but that the most attractive characters should win, even if their morals were
not of the highest order.
It was as if there was some benefit to the public in going to the theatre or reading
a novel. This benefit lay not only in the enjoyment of an entertainment defined by the
public’s general obedience to the mechanisms of the theatre or the novel (whether
these were spectacular in the literal sense of the word or were sufficiently complex to
provoke surprise), but also in the pleasure of seeing the portrayal of simulacra of social
behaviours with the potential for profit, be it temporary (until the point where the
denouement reintroduced an often fragile or ambiguous order) or permanent (until
the end of the plot). Often, over and above any moral closure, it was the acquisition of
money, for all the characters, that became the driving force for the plot and for
dramatic action, much more clearly than in earlier periods, and all the more so because
there was an obvious audience demand for it. In this cause, nothing was forbidden,
from disguise and the guiles of the classic trickster to the manipulation of the law. In
other words, and for the greater enjoyment, the greater profit, and the greater interest
of the spectator, strongly individualised characters (stock types that had broken away
from their narrow definitions and developed into full characters and then into
individuals) went about their business on stage, adapting social rules that relied on the
legal system to their own advantage in order to achieve the realisation of their own
personal interest that was primarily portrayed as economic in nature. Plots, while
13.

That is to say, characters who neither breach the basic laws that regulated the social world and the plot
nor are in perfect agreement with them. See infra Part VII.
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appearing to denounce illicit practices and sordid calculations, at the same time
proposed courses of action to the public that were illegal but effective—ways to avoid
justice by exploiting the rules and procedures of the law itself, along with those that
governed economic activities (e.g., deals, business, etc.). These offered audiences and
readers the chance to benefit from something more than models of virtue.
The modelling of profit by portraying probable behaviours offered a new way of
attracting the attention of members of the public. It did so by implicating them not
in a moral judgement by condemning or exonerating the authors of the crimes, but in
an appreciation of such patterns of behaviour based on outcomes that were tangible—
that is, financial and material. And while denouements would still sometimes, albeit
with increasing rarity, feature Justice and Morality cloaked in power and virtue,
audiences were more often likely to witness the triumph of those who were openly
lacking in principles, of rakes who were both lovers and financially astute or, at best,
brilliant tacticians in legal affairs who were a little less bandit-like than the rest.
In these texts, which needed to appeal to their audiences through their pace,
liveliness, sense of rhythm, and concision, characters had to act quickly, with
virtuosity, using tried techniques; know how to risk everything while protecting
themselves against the consequences of their actions; and finally come to the
understanding that the law was a source of arms rather than the repository of values.
The proverbial slow-moving nature of justice would be exploited to the benefit of
those involved, affairs that were already problematic would be delayed, and potential
problems would be speedily circumvented through negotiation. The aim of such
moves was to gain possession of the physical or symbolic goods that participants
hoped to win as quickly and fully as possible. This dynamic resulted in the
consecration of the theatrical, or novelistic, space as a space in motion, a troubled
space, but one that was always regulated by a rapid flux, operating within a system of
exchange that was not necessarily legitimised by a charitable and absolute morality.
VI. THE CITY AND THE HOUSEHOLD: GEOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, AND LEGAL
ENVIRONMENTS

It is clear that in France, from the time of Louis XIV’s great withdrawal into
personal devotion and, above all, from the time of his sad exile at Marly,14 it was in
the city that innovations in literature were being made. It was not that the court was
no longer important, but that it had become effectively marginalised where literary
creativity was concerned. The publications of exiled Huguenots (following the
revocation of the Edict of Nantes), the salons, Parisian theatres, and wide and varied
range of coffee houses and meeting places had become the new crossroads of modern
society. The weight of the city, as Daniel Roche suggests, had become vast in both
the economic and cultural spheres.15

14.

During his exile at Marly, he left the sumptuous Versailles castle and the hordes of courtiers to live,
pray, and govern in a relative religious solitude, close to his new wife, Madame de Maintenon.

15.

See Roche, supra note 6, ch. II, at 43.
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As a modern and consequently more liberated space, the city became the hub of
all economic and cultural interactions, of all exchanges and negotiations. It allowed
independence and fiscal freedom, but also individual freedom, was more open to
various incomers,16 harboured an ever-expanding population, and served increasingly
as a showcase for the architectural tendencies of the time in both quantity and
quality. It consequently allowed new patterns of behaviour to develop and new
cultural and social habits to come into being, making a new and different social
hierarchy possible. Inevitably, all these changes were portrayed, discussed, and even
hyperbolised and caricatured in the artistic production of the city’s most visible
culturally interactive space: the theatre.
In the midst of this change and movement, the merchant played a major role in
the rapid growth of urban consumption.17 In the plots of plays and novels, too, he
was an essential character. He was surrounded by a gallery of figures, aided by the
financier, by collectors of taxes and duties, by the merchant’s wife, and by the
speculator—all key players in the highly varied cast of the great financial comedy of
the times. The character of the money-man knew how to speak the language of
finance, how to exploit social and economic rules for his own gain, and how to act as
an intermediary rather than a possessor of goods, income, or fixed capital. The
merchant was therefore a social and dramatic entity who dictated his own patterns of
behaviour. Plots would accordingly be constructed around this central character
(male or female), which was itself divided into a number of particular functions.
Comedies overtly set out now to attack this multi-faceted figure, which was generally
portrayed either as a person of bourgeois status hoping to gain, by morally dubious
means, a power that was not his or her due,18 or as a Jew.19 Such plots might also
demonstrate, sometimes concurrently, that in playing the merchant’s game it was
possible for young heroes and heroines, with the help of servants, to outwit the
greedy bourgeois and eventually take possession of his property. These patterns were
so prevalent that all the characters found themselves, more or less, in the role of
negotiators, each according to his or her character, whether they were “bargaining”
family heads, young rakes, triumphant younger sons, interested widows, young
marriageable women, or even servants.
Whether they were the merchant’s allies, enemies, or employees, servants were in
the process of undergoing a change in status. This was firstly because their numbers
had increased and their precise origins were less identifiable. Previously, a manservant
or maid would have been brought to the city from the master’s country estate and the
16.

The influx of members of the rural population, in particular those destined for domestic service, was
significant, as the growing number of employment agencies showed.

17.

See Stoyan Tzonev, Le Financier dans la comédie française de l’Ancien Régime (1977);
Daniel Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et société au Grand Siècle (1984); see also La Mobilité
sociale au XVIIe siècle, XVIIe siècle: revue trimestrielle, n°122, janv-mars, 31e année-1, 1979.

18.

See M. de Barquebois [Jacques Robbe], La Rapînière ou l’Intéressé (Paris, E. Lucas 1683);
Alain-René Lesage, Turcaret (Paris, P. Ribou 1709).

19.

See Dancourt, supra note 10; see also Nicolas Boindin, Le Port de mer, comédie (Paris, P. Ribou
1704).
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details of their identities would have been known to the master. Now, although this
was still sometimes the case, it was no longer the rule. It had become the practice for
servants to travel of their own accord and, in moving from the country to the city,
the link they created between the two worlds was less directly under the control of
their employers. This was now the era of the employment agency, which provided a
less identifiable and more fluid staff of people who were less attached to their masters.
Like Jacob in Marivaux’s novel Le Paysan parvenu 20 who appears, in this respect, as
one of the most symptomatic servant characters of this period, these dangerous “new
servants,” new figurations of all social fears and fantasies, established themselves in
the city and its households, entered the domestic space without being completely
bound to it, and had access to all urban social groups, even though their own origins
were rural. This pattern was so widespread that their mobility and adaptability was
feared, just as their ability to escape past control was a generally agreed upon fact.
The myth of the servant who became a rich bourgeois, having overcome the various
social and class barriers through trickery, cheating, play and negotiation, came to be
generally accepted in the public imagination as well as in literary texts. Although
this belief is contradicted by the historical facts, 21 the figure of the servant was
nevertheless a source of concern, allowing literary authors to invent fictional
characters that, in the course of the performance, both suggested and demonstrated
the permeability of the class structure.
Between the marginal figure and the rich property owner there was now no
radical difference in people’s minds, since everyone could, if he or she worked hard
enough, move from one status to the other. Whether master or servant, man of
substance or businesswoman, it was possible to play the great game of interest. This
provided a matrix for theatrical plots and narrative schemas and was one of the most
visible concerns that justified the denunciation of an imagined social mobility
working to destabilise individual status and social orders. What is more, servants
increasingly clearly acted as go-betweens for the different social groups, thereby
reinforcing the circulation of ideas and goods.
VII. THE NEW HEROES: INDIVIDUALS AT THE MARGINS

The seventeenth century saw the arrival, in comedy, tragedy, and the novel, of
new heroes—those characters I have described as “lacking in common law.” I will
merely remind readers here of the argument that has already been developed. Such
characters had to fight for their status and it was hard for them to exercise their
individual rights in a society that favoured fathers and eldest sons, people who were
a priori deemed “competent” by the law. Widows, younger sons, bastards, and
unmarried daughters over twenty-five flocked onto the stage and the pages of novels
and genuinely inf luenced the course of fiction, drawing it into a dramatic and
narrative dynamic that changed the framework of the way the century thought.
20. Pierre de Marivaux, Le Paysan parvenu (Paris, P. Prault 1734–35).
21.

See Dessert, supra note 17.
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We shall, therefore, take as our starting point an initial observation that has
already been discussed: characters who did not completely conform to social and
aesthetic norms, but who did not break with them either, occupied the front of the
stage for that very reason. They established a play on the norm to the extent that this
norm allowed a space for negotiation and did not impose fixed states. Here, they
transformed the norm by appropriating its mechanisms, and by entering into
negotiation with it, drawing on the principle that it contained gaps that needed to be
filled through their labours. This principle gave them an interest. These characters
interested readers and audiences because they were presented as new and independent
entities. In this they were a source of surprise and pleasure and a stimulus to
reflection. They acted in their own interest, in its name alone, and often triumphed
over events. This is proof enough that, in the physical exteriority emphasised by the
theatricality of performance, identity and difference were not simple extremes, but
were complex, contradictory, and relative in nature.
From this point on, in order to exist or, rather, in order to become a complete
person, a fictional character would operate in two ways. Not only would it enter into
a relationship of play with the law, evaluating its flaws and its fictions; it would also
adopt its logic and processes. It was thus through the law, with it, sometimes against
it, and often by means of the gaps in it, that characters acted in literary plots. In the
context of the law and its processes, the new heroes thus followed a path whose
driving force was interest: the interest which motivated them; their personal or
individual interest in events; their interest in the persons of others or the interest in
themselves that they were able to arouse in others; and, last, the interest aroused by
them, by their conduct and their strategies, in readers and spectators. In other words,
it was not only the interest on which the whole work was founded that was important,
but also any interest acquired or preserved in the course of the plot that was overt
and accountable.
In the comic theatre of the end of Louis XIV’s reign—too rapidly dismissed by
commentators as cynical despite the fact that it asked questions unanswered by the
law or society—it was these “others” who were introduced on stage; characters who,
through their legal status, escaped the law or shed doubt on it without overturning it.
The Other was thus, in the first instance, these “others,” these individual characters
who created a porosity in the society depicted by the theatre, making it relax its
hierarchies and renounce absolute values. At a time when the individual lay claim to
his rights, when it was possible for fiction to serve as the basis for the invention of a
new social life, the novel and comic theatre made use of “others” to eat away at a
fragile norm, to define a literary and social “game” that relativised fixed positions
and subjected them to a sum of probable circumstances. Servants could become
masters and masters could become speculators; widows embraced and controlled
social change; the whole of society faltered in its course but, for all that, it did not
founder. This proliferation of figures, postures, characters, and significations on the
Almanach’s image shows that the period was typified by transactions, contracts of all
kinds that replaced pre-established codified values with an evolving and mercantile
system in which money clearly played a central role.
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However, it is immediately clear that what allowed these characters to be “Other”
was, in principle, the existence of a norm—not in the sense of a fixed doxa, but,
rather, of a developing and relative set of rules often constructed on legal fictions.
The system of reference was effectively defined by a law that was eager to specify the
regulatory norm for human relationships, but was unable to do so completely, that
wished to constrain the actions of those who escaped it but suffered from inherent
weaknesses that prevented any absolute definition of the norm, and that would
eventually provide the legal subject with the means to escape its grasp.
VIII. THE THEATRE: LOCUS OF CONFRONTATION, QUESTIONING, AND DOUBT

For this reason, in comic theatre at the end of Louis XIV’s reign, and more
generally in the literature of this period, characters, motivated by interest, were not
in a state of rupture, but functioned instead in an intermediate area not opposed to
beliefs, conscience, ego, or law and situated in the gaps between them.
This is quite a surprising assertion given our awareness that in a dialogue there
are always two participants, one and the other; one confronting the other, fighting for
power over words or control over ideas, for the possession, oppression, or seduction of
the other. Likewise, in a monologue, we expect to find one and the other united in
the same character and weighing up contradictory views in order to conclude (or not)
with a decision that excludes the opposing view. In principle, theatre, as the art of
contradiction, of opposition, of the agôn, presupposes a confrontation of conflicting
values either between or within characters, staging a combat between contradictory
choices and moralities. There is plenty of “otherness” to be found here; that is, plenty
of difference, of opposites, of opposition, in the binary system governing the plot and
the functioning of the characters. Matters may well become more complex when,
moving away from simple term-for-term opposition, texts create combinations of
contradictions. But it is always possible to view the evolution of the dramatic and
ideological performance in each scene in binary terms: such-and-such a hero or
character, in search of his goal, has helpers and opponents and hesitates between
different actions in the name of some value or other.
It must be said, though, on closer examination, that matters indeed became more
complex now that values were neither simple nor absolute. From now on, characters
were no longer either in confrontation or in agreement and could no longer be
immediately distinguished according to a scale of values because the available
reference points were no longer fixed. We could even contend that the conflicts and
agôns peculiar to the theatre demonstrated that the most stable values were useless
since they lacked foundation, or were open to criticism or debate, because these
conflicts introduced not truth but questions about truth. The theatre, through its
very mechanisms, made it possible for there to be hesitation, ambiguity, and
inconclusive, wide-ranging, and independent judgements that were founded on
contradiction. Because of this, eventually, the other would no longer exist, or only
the other would exist, which amounts to the same thing and was an inevitable
outcome if all judgements were to be made possible and all questions asked. The
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theatre, as a site of different confrontations, would thus define a crisis in values
through its very construction, and, although it could choose to end the crises it
portrayed so as to bring reflection and performance to a harmonious close, the trace
of its questions and their impact still remained. By allowing its characters to hesitate,
to open up values to debate and doubt, the theatre made it possible for any absolute
divide between the law, founding values, virtue, and their opposites to disappear.
The site of the confrontation between the one and the other therefore became the
site of play, a link between the one or the other, thereby staging a confusion of
previously clear identities.
IX. POETIC JUSTICE DURING TWO POST-BAROQUE PERIODS

Authors acted as advocates, while readers and spectators were judges who were
free to pass judgement on the legitimacy of the fiction and the lessons set out by the
author and illustrated by the characters. We can see how this new aesthetic
introduced, along with relative values, the concepts of the contract and of play. Here,
too, we encounter a space where decisions, criticisms, and reflection formed part of
the practice of writing a play’s ideological message and of possible acts of interpretation
relating to it. This link between literature and the law, which bore the marks of
modernity, was to be an enduring one.
The theatre was now the site of a sort of economic and aesthetic contract between
the author and actors on the one hand, and the spectator and reader on the other. Of
course, the implementation of a contract is not unproblematic, given that its function
is to regulate conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the interests of each of the parties
need to be taken into account in order to try to resolve these conflicts or, should this
prove impossible, to propose a settlement based on authority, tradition, force, or
calculation.
Spectators came to the theatre to purchase entertainment, to watch illusions, to
consume a lie. To this deal, both sides wished to add the proviso that the entertainment
should not be “free.” In return for the spectator’s money, the author and the actors
would therefore offer entertainment (illusion and pleasure) plus interest, that is,
moral, political, and philosophical utility. In principle, this potential interest was
supposed to be of a moral nature and to contribute to social cohesion, but it has to be
said that it could sometimes be critical in character or even provoke doubt both in
the performance itself and in the mind of the spectator. In other words, an ambiguous
system of exchange—money for entertainment plus moral or “critical” interest—was
established, making the theatre dangerous in the eyes of those who feared pure
entertainment, seeing it as the personal and social consequence of doubt. The
normative positions adopted by theoreticians, authors, and actors were thus intended
to restrict ambiguity or to ignore it, claiming a useful interest rather than a corrosive
one, such as the desire to reduce the theatre to an entertainment involving merely
simple pleasure in spectacle. Exchange would then, in principle, be reintegrated into
the aesthetics of entertainment, or into normative ethics, enabling comedy to leave
its “deceitful” status behind. Yet, the search for a personal critical benefit to the
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spectator, at least in declarations of principle, was a vain one. Interest would inevitably
escape the aesthetic framework and exceed the limits of normative ethics, a fortiori
when comedy presented itself as the satirical mirror of a society, as it did at the end
of Louis XIV’s reign.
The models for dramatic action were the financial games that were, in turn,
based on the very real games to be observed and imagined by audiences in French
society itself. The action thus extended beyond the space-time of the performance.
This is what the Almanach’s image shows: the justice engraved on the page of the
Almanach is supposed to be the image the king wants represented as “real” justice, but
this official and drawn justice is, in fact, a justice of comedy, a theatrical justice. 22
As I said before, one can observe that, by referring directly to the spectator’s
world, the comic theatre of the end of Louis XIV’s reign constantly evaluates the
faults, pretences, lies, and negotiations of this supposed “real” world. This is what the
Almanach’s picture relays. It offers an engraving that anyone can pin on his wall and
examine precisely, closely, slowly, character-by-character, posture-by-posture, all
year long. And what can be seen behind the image is a comedy: a form of pretence,
of course. But this pretence transcribes a stylised reality that is itself a tissue of
pretences, and whose workings are assessed through theatre. In both worlds,
theatrical and “real,” what was just and certain had become uncertain. Justice was
portrayed as relative and negotiated to such an extent that the interest that emerged
from within the theatrical relationship could only be profoundly critical in nature. It
was possible to show outrage at all this, to restore order, to be scandalised, even,
within the play itself as a way of making interest “useful,” and binding it to a moral,
social, and political norm. It was clear, however, that the harm had already been
done and that audiences had literally interested themselves in the dysfunctions of
society and of the aesthetic relationship.
As we have seen, the hesitation between fiction and reality, and between certainty
and uncertainty; the anxiety coming from a general oscillation and doubt about
values; the discordance between social conducts and behaviours and principles of
law; and the fascination with virtuality were common in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. This post-baroque moment, coming just before the
Enlightenment, definitely has something to say to us in a postmodern and neobaroque time, and it is clear that the current “digital baroque,” as Richard Sherwin
has described it, 23 resembles the early modern one. The moments are alike in the way
they love and hate images, by the way they play with them, and by the way they play
with emotions as well as with every rule and value. They resemble one another not
only by their hesitation about these values, not only by the game the “actors” (of the
real, of the stage, of the engravings, of the images) are playing on them, but also by
the way a visual culture, which takes place inside this historical and ideological
moment, is enacted. There is also a visual culture, and a visual popular culture,
22.

A “poetical justice,” as John Gay would have said for his The Beggar’s Opera. See John Gay, The
Beggar’s Opera, act 3, scene 16, at 114 (Vivien Jones & David Lindler eds., Methuen Drama 2010)
(1728).

23.

Sherwin, supra note 5.
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during the early modern period. And this visual culture shows (as does ours) that
doubt, and the feeling of doubt, is everywhere: in literature, in the arts, and in the
practice of law. It shows that the rationalists’ assumptions underlying law are
inadequate to the social conducts and to the practice of law itself, and that the arts
can, and must, instead propose other conducts, fictions, representations, and
behaviours to be judged. This is so even if there is, at the same time, an overabundance
of forms and measures in culture, and of theories and practices in law, and even if
everyone—the actors, the authors and the spectators, and the citizens in general—is
disoriented and uncertain.
Today, as in the previous baroque age, there are no more transcendental
references. And as we see them fail, the sense of uncertainty and of the uncanny
during these two post-baroque periods leads people to hesitate about everything—
about every value, about what they see, and about how they are supposed to live.
Digital or early modern, the post-baroque oscillates. But this oscillation not only
provides a source of trouble. It also gives us a moment of macabre pleasure: the
pleasure of dancing over ruins.
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